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M.: The Physician-Patient Privilege

STUDENT NOTE
THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE.-Except for the adoption
of the privilege in justice of the peace courts,' the common law
rule prevails that there are no privileged communications between
a physician and patient.2 There is no case where the matter of
physician's privilege has come squarely before our court. In one
case by way of dictum, the court affirms the common law view in
the courts of record.3 The following discussion may perhaps illustrate the wisdom of our view by indicating some of the ramifications
that have occurred in the states that have enacted privilege statutes.
The first inroad on the common law occurred in New York
in 1828, when by legislative act, a privilege was created.4 In general
it allowed information obtained by the physician in his professional
treatment of a patient to be privileged. With modifications this
privilege has been adopted in about two-thirds of the states. In
an effort to curb the abuses resulting from this privilege many
legislatures had added qualifications to the basic privilege, to such
an extent that if all the qualifications from the various statutes were
combined, the net result would probably approximate the common
law rule.6 For this reason this note is not designed to give an
analysis of the various privilege statutes, but is rather a consideration of a general privilege statute.
Most of the statutes speak in terms of "physician" or "physician and surgeon" thus excluding unlicensed physicians,- chiropractors," druggists,9 dentists, 10 veterinary surgeons," orthopedists.-'
The privilege is based on the conception that society will be
better served if the communications of a patient to his physician are
treated as confidential resulting in increasing the patient's confidence and trust in his physician when he realizes that his disclosures
will not be made public. In turn the physician benefits by acquir1WI.

28

VA. CODE

c, 50, art. 6, § 10 (Michie 1955).

WmORom, EVIDENCE § 2380 (3d ed. 1940): "Duchess of Kingston's Trial,

20 How. St. Tr. 573 ....

L. C. J. Mansfield. .

.

. 'If a surgeon was voluntarily

to reveal these secrets, to be sure, he would be guilty of a breach of honor and of
great indiscretion; but to give that information in a court of justice, which by

the law of the land he is bound to do, will never be imputed to him as any

indiscretion whatever.'

See, generally, 8 WIGMORRE, EVIDENCME n. 3.

•3
Mohr v. Mohr, 119 IV. Va. 253, 256, 193 S.E. 121, 122 (1937).
4 8 'WIOMOR EVIDENCz 803 n. 4.

5Id. at n. 5.
8 Curd, Privilege Communications Between the Doctor and His PatientAn Anomaly of the Law, 44 W. VA. L.Q. 165, 173-4 (1938).
7 Wiel v. Cowles, 45 Hun. 307 (N.Y. 1887).
8 S.H. Kress & Co. v. Sharp, 156 Miss. 693, 126 So. 650 (1930).
9Brown v. Hannibal & St. J. Ry., 66 Me. 588 (1877).
10 People v. De France, 104 Mich. 563, 62 N.W. 709 (1895).
"Hendershot v. Western U. Tel. Co., 106 Iowa 529, 76 N.W. 828 (1898).
12 William Laurie Co. v. McCullough, 174 Ind. 477, 90 N.E. 1014 (1910).
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ing all of the facts and being able to effectuate his treatment more
rapidly. In order that the privilege may operate, there must be
professional treatment by the physician,' 3 and, though not favored
by all courts, a physician-patient relation, i.e., a voluntary consulting
of the physician. 4
So where the patient consults a physician merely for the purpose
of examination and not for treatment, the reason for the privilege
does not exist. Any communications made are not privileged.13
This type of situation frequently occurs where a third party
employs a physician to examine the patient, as in the case of a life
insurance company before issuing a policy, 6 an employer before
hiring an employee, 17 or a lawyer to have his client examined in
preparation for trial.' s The privilege has been allowed where the
patient was examined with a view toward a curative treatment
which in fact never occurred because of physical impossibility.'
The same is true in criminal cases where, by direction of officers, the accused is examined by a physician. Information so
acquired is not privileged.2 0 However, there is a conflict of authority in the situation where the accused is not only examined but
given treatment. Some courts conclude that the ensuing treatment,
though involuntary on the part of the patient, is sufficient to allow
the privilege to exist.21 They perhaps fail to realize that an unwilling patient is apt to place little trust in an appoifited physician
and hence the privilege should not exist.22
Whether the privilege exists after the patient's death is a
problem that has frequently come before the courts. A majority
have founded their decision on the idea that the privilege is
designed to protect the patient from having his secrets divulged
1aBurgdorf v. Keeven, 351 Mo. 1003, 174 S.W.2d 816 (1943); Annot., 107
A.L.R. 1491, 1495 (1937).
14 Scolavine v. State, 187 Misc. 253, 62 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1946), modified, 271 App.

Div. 618, 67 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1946), afl'd as modified, 297 N.Y. 460, 74 N.E.2d 174
(1947).
15 Arnold v. Maryville. 110 Mo. App. 254, 85 S.W. 107 (1905) (examination at
request of patient in order to qualify physician to testify in action for injuries).
16McGinty v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 166 Wis. 83, 164 N.W. 249
(1917).
17 Moutzoukos v. Mutual Ben. Health & Acci. Ins. Co., 69
Utah 309, 254 Pac.
1005 (1927).
18 City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231
P.2d 26 (1951).
19 Bassil v. Ford Motor Co., 278 Mich. 173, 270 N.W. 258 (1936) (consultation by husband and wife because of lack of children; physician examined
husband and found him to be sterile).
-20State v. Dean, 69 Utah 268, 254 Pac. 142 (1927) (at request of sheriff,
physician examined rape suspect).
21 Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
22 See note II supra; see note 21 supra, dissenting opinion.
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by his physician, and it ought to exist after his death to protect
his memory and loved ones from embarrassing disclosures. They
extend the privilege to the patient's successor in interest.23 So
where the beneficiary or assignee attempts to recover on the patient's
insurance policy, and the company attempts to introduce communications between the insured and his physician, the courts have
allowed the beneficiary to evoke the privilege and exclude the
testimony.24 In the reverse of this situation, where the beneficiary
introduces testimony from the patient's physician, the courts have
ruled that the insurance company, being adverse to the patient's
interest, does not have the benefit of the privilege.25
In the case of will contests, where both parties are claiming
under the patient, tie courts have allowed either party to waive the
privilege without the consent of the other,2 a result which accords
with the rule allowing the construction of wills in the light of all
the facts. The same rule seems to apply to cases where the validity
of a deed is attacked by the heirs of the grantor-patient.21 Some
courts have expressly rejected the majority view by reasoning that
the privilege is personal to the patient; and hence it can only be
waived by him.28
An interesting attempt to extend the privilege has occurred in
criminal cases where the one, against whom the physician's testiniony is offered, seeks to claim the privilege. Thus the accused
in a murder case may seek to exclude the testimony of a physician
concerning information he received while treating the victim. The
courts, with one exception, 0 refuse to extend the privilege. :' 0
Statements contained in hospital records are protected by some
courts under the privileged communication statute." ' The prevailing view is that the privilege does not extend to information
2"Novak v. Chicago Fraternal Life Ass'n, 186 Kan. 609, 16 P.2d 507 (1932);
Annot.,
31 A.L.R. 159 (1924), 126 A.L.R. 380 (1940).
2
4 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. McAdoo, 106 F.2d 618 (Sth Cir. 1939).
25 Olson v. Court of Honor, 100 Minn. 117, 110 N.W. 374, 8 L.R.A.

(N.S.)

521, 117 Am. St. Rep. 676, 10 Ann. Cas. 622 (1907).
26 Gorman v. Hickey, 145 Kan. 51, 64 P.2d 587 (1937) (contesting heirs
could waive, though executor was opposed to waiver); Marker v. McCue, 50
Idaho 462, 297 Pac. 401 (1931) (executor could waive).
27 Flack v. Brewster

107 Kan. 63, 140 Pac. 616 (1920).

28 Harrison v. Sutter St. Ry., 116 Cal. 156, 47 Pac. 1019 (1897).
29 Some New

York courts may allow

the privilege

where the

victim

is a

party to the crime and survives. People v. Murphy, 101 N.Y. 126, 4 N.E. 326
(1886) (woman consented to criminal abortion and survived).
so Cabe v. State, 182 Ark. 49, 30 S.W.2d 855 (1930); State v. Thomas, 1 Wn.2d
298, 95 P.2d 1036 (1939).
3' Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McSwain, 149 Miss. 455, 115 So. 555 (1928);
Annot., 75 A.L.R. 393 (1931), 120 A.L.R. 1140 (1939).
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obtained in performing an autopsy. 32 This result has been justified
on two grounds: first, the object of the privilege, to encourage
patients to disclose freely all relevant facts to the physician, is not
violated; and secondly, the physician-patient relation does not
exist where the patient is dead.
Analogous problems have arisen where the physician is called
to treat an unconscious person who later dies; or where he is called
to treat a suicidal person against his will. In both of these situations, the courts have held that the information obtained was
privileged.33 Although in view of the lack of a physician-patient
relation the wisdom of the result may be questioned.
The courts are in conflict as to whether the physician may
testify as to facts acquired through ordinary observation as distinguished from professional treatment. Perhaps a majority of the
courts hold that a physician may not testify concerning a patient's
state of intoxication at the time of treatment. 34 The wisdom of this
rule has been questioned in auto accident cases where the patient's
liability may hinge on this fact. 35 However, where the facts
observed or information obtained is distinct from the professional
relation with the patient, the courts have allowed the physician to
disclose them.36
A more difficult question arises in accident cases where the
patient, in describing his symptoms, makes references as to how the
accident occurred. The courts are not in harmony as to whether
such information is privileged.317 A related problem occurs in the
field of psychotherapy. Here, by the very nature of the treatment,
the psychiatrist must have access not only to facts as to the patient's
physical condition, but, to a much greater extent, to his entire
3
2 Cross v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 228 Iowa 803, 293 N.W. 464 (1940);
Annot., 58 A.L.R. 1127, 1134 (1929). Contra, Mathews v. Rex Health & Acci.
Ins. Co., 86 Ind. 335, 157 N.E. 467 (1927).
33 Palmer v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 187 Minn. 272, 245
N.W. 146 (1932) (unconscious person found in garage with car running, physician
who tried to revive him could not testify as to carbon monoxide poisoning).
Meyer v. Knights of Pythias, 178 N.Y. 63, 70 N.E. 111 (1904) (patient who had
swallowed poison).
34 Freeburg v. State, 92 Neb. 346, 138 N.W. 143 (1912); Annot., 79 A.L.R.
1127, 1131 (1931).
35 Perry v. Hannagan, 257 Mich, 120, 241 N.W. 232 (1932).
30 Myers v. State, 192 Ind. 542, 137 N.E. 547 (1922) (physician calling on
husband heard him threaten his wife's life-such information was not privileged
in prosecution of wife for murder of husband); Jennings v. Supreme Council,
81 App. Div. 76, 81 N.Y. Supp. 90 (1903) (physician attending one member of
family could testify as to health of other members).
37 Raymond v. Burlington, C.R. - N. Ry., 65 Iowa 152, 21 N.W. 495 (1884);
see also, Chafee, Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth
on the Witness Stand?, 52 YAX L.J. 607, 614 (1942), for a defense of this position.
Contra, Green v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 63 N.E. 958 (1902).
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mental and subconscious state thus throwing the cloak of the
privilege over practically all communications between the patient
and physician, if the reason for the rule is to be applied. 38 Such
non-confidential matters between the patient and physician as the
dates of professional visits and to whom he rendered the bill arc
not within the privilege.39
There is a lack of uniformity among the courts on the question
of whether nurses or other attendants to physicians present during
the consultation come within the privilege. Some courts have
refused to extend the privilege to them, by reasoning that the
privilege statute is in derogation of the common law and must
be strictly construed. Since it does not specify nurses, they are
not within the privilege. 40 While other courts, reasoning on agency
principles, include them within the privilege if they are assisting
41
or acting under the direction of the physician.
Where third persons are present, other than nurses, some
courts have declared that the confidential relation does not exist
between the physician and patient. Therefore both the physician
and third person may testify.42 Perhaps it may be said that a
patient may have no qualms in disclosing his secrets in front of a
trusted friend or relative, but would shrink from doing so in front
of a physician if he thought it was non-privileged. Other courts,
construing the statute literally, allow the third party to testify,
but withhold the testimony of the physician unless he has the consent of the patient. 4'a This approach has the dubious merit of
upholding the letter of the privilege, but depriving it of its effect.
It has been generally held that the bringing of a suit for personal injuries will not waive the privilege. 44 One of the purposes
for the privilege, i.e., protecting the patient from public disclosures
of his infirmities, no longer exists. A numerical majority of the
courts seeni to hold that a patient voluntarily testifying on direct
examination, respecting his consultation with a physician and revealing only the general nature of his mental and physicial con38 GuT-rMAcmmR & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW c. 12 (1952).
39 Leeds v. Prudential Ins. Co., 128 Neb. 895, 258 N.W. 672 (1935)
of professional visits); Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 588, 131 Ad. 432
(who paid physician's bill).
40 Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947); Annot., 169
668, 678 (1947).
41
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Jordan, 164 Miss. 174, 143 So. 183
4
2 State v. Knight, 204 Iowa 819, 216 N.W. 104 (1927); Annot., 96
1420 43(1935).
Wells v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 187 Pa. 166, 40 At. 802
44

(dates
(1925)
A.L.R.
(1932).
A.L.R.
(1898).

Smart v. Kansas City, 208 Mo. 162, 105 S.W. 709 (1907).
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dition at that time, does not thereby waive the privilege. 45 Such a
rule may, in the words of a leading commentator, offer license
perjury.401 However, where the patient on direct examination
testifies in detail as to his injuries, the physician's treatment and
his communications with the physician the privilege is waived. 4 7
Where on cross-examination the patient answers questions in
regard to communications made to his physician, the majority ot
courts hold that the privilege is not waived. 48 The reason given
is that such statements are not voluntary. The counter argument
that a failure to assert the privilege should be a complete waiver
has merit. The patient, in order to waive the privilege by an expression of willingness, must show that the expression is voluntary,
and that he is aware of his privilege. 49
The rule seems to be that, while the calling of one physician
is a waiver as to him,50 it is not a waiver in regard to other physicians
who have been consulted by the patient at other times. 51 The
absurdity of this result has been well expressed by Lamm, J., dissenting in State v. Long:
"A litigant should not be allowed to pick and choose in binding and loosing; he may bind or he may loose. If he binds.
well and good; but if he looses as to one of his physicians,
the seal of secrecy is gone-the spell of its charm is broken as
to all .... He may choose a serviceable and mellow one out of
a number of physicians to fasten liability on the defendant,
and then, presto! change! exclude the testimony of those not
so serviceable, to whom he has voluntarily given the same
information and the same means of getting at a conclusion on
the matters already uncovered by professional testimony to
the jury. There is no reason in such
condition of things,
52
and where reason ends the law ends."
Where several physicians attend in consultation, the better rule,
and the one favored by most of the courts, is that a waiver as to
one of the physicians is a waiver as to all.53 Where the patient
45 Cohodes v. Menominee & M. Light & Traction Co., 149 Wis. 308, 135 N.W.
879 (1912); Annot., 114 A.L.R. 798 (1938).
40 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2389 (3).
" Epstein v. Pennsylvania Ry., 250 Mo. 1, 156 S.W. 699 (1913).
48 Harpman v. Devine, 133 Ohio St. 1, 10 N.E.2d 776 (1937).
49 Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Simpson, 158 Miss. 390, 130 So. 479 (1930);
Annot., 72 A.L.R. 148 (1931).
50Wheelock v. Godfrey, 100 Cal. 578, 35 Pac. 317 (1893).
51 Hirschberg v. Southern Pac. Ry., 180 Cal. 774, 183 Pac. 141 (1919). The
reason for the rule is that a patient may have particular confidence in one
doctor and will waive as to him, but will not have the same confidence in
another. Annot., 62 A.L.R. 675, 680 (1929).
2208 Mo. 162, 105 S.W. 709 (1907).
53 Cretney v. Woodmen Acci. Co., 196 Wis. 29, 219 N.W. 448 (1928); Annot.,
62 A.L.R. 675, 680 (1929). Contra, Jones v. Caldwell, 20 Idaho 5, 116 Pac. 110
(1911).
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waives the privilege during the trial such waiver ought to extend
to testimony of the same nature by the same physician at a succeeding trial; but all courts do not so hold.54 There are two lines of
authority as to whether the successors in interest of the patient
can waive his privilege after his death. The majority of the courts
allow them to waive on the ground that they have the right to
protect the interest which they claim under him.55 The other
courts do not allow them to waive on the ground that the privilege
was personal to the patient and ended at his death.5" The representative of an insane person or a minor may waive the privilege.Y
Much has been said concerning the privilege; and most of the
commentators are critical of it.-" The reason for the rule is it
fosters confidence in the patient toward his physician by protecting
his disclosures, thus promoting the treatment of his ailments. The
privilege involves favoring secrecy over truth, which runs counter
to the demands of justice, and should not be sustained unless overcome by strong social policy. The proposition that a patient's
frankness with his physician is dependent on whether his disclosures
are privileged is not applicable to many types of cases. When a
person's health is jeopardized, it is doubtful that he will generally
be evasive with his physician merely because of fear of public disclosure. The category of socially stigmatized diseases has been
vastly reduced as medical knowledge has increased. The idea that
a patient would suffer from public disclosure is today greatly
minimized. The cases show too frequently the harm of the privilege. The patient is neither protected nor justice served by invoking the privilege. Too often the privilege is invoked only to
perpetuate a one-sided picture of the patient's health by preventing
testimony from what is generally the best source of knowledge, the
physician who treated him. One of the best solutions to the problem exists in North Carolina, where the statute allows the presiding
judge to compel testimony when it is needed for the proper adT. B. M.
ministration of justice.5
5 Elliott v. Kansas City, 198 Mo. 593, 96 S.W. 1023 (1906). Contra, Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Maloney, 119 Ark. 434, 178 S.W. 387 (1915); see 8 WGMORE,
EvtDNcE § 2389 n. 8, for conflicting cases.
55 See notes 20, 23 and 24 supra.
50 See note 25 supra.
57 8 Wisr ooR, EVMENCE § 2391.
58 McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE c. 11, § 108 (1954); 8 WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2380;
Curd, Privilege Communications Between the Doctor and His Patient-An
Anomaly of the Law, 44 W. VA. L.Q. 165 (1938); Chafee, Is Justice Served or
Obstructed by Closing the Doctors Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J.
607 (19,42).
59 N. C. GEN. STATS. § 8-53 (1953).
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